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Abstract
This Article is organized into five parts. Part I situates Canada’s climate change experience. In
Part II, Canada’s regulatory response to climate change and its gaps are positioned within a troubling ongoing federal retreat from the environmental arena that seems to favor resource extraction
and export. Parts III to V discuss the possibility for increased human rights-based climate litigation in the Canadian context—even in light of past failures—and consider an emerging public law
approach. The Article concludes by commenting on the prospect of the climate change problem
playing out in Canadian courts.
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“Everyone is aware that individually and collectively,
we are responsible for preserving the natural
environment.” 1
-Justice Charles Gonthier, Supreme Court of Canada
“We are the last generation that can fight climate
change. We have a duty to act.” 2
-Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General
INTRODUCTION
Canada has the dubious honor of being voted “Fossil of the
Year” an unprecedented seven times. This includes the ignominious
lifetime “Colossal Fossil” award of 2013. These fossil awards are
handed out annually at the conclusion of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change3 (“UNFCCC”)
Conference of the Parties’ (“COP”) to the State that has done the most
to undermine or otherwise impede international progress towards
combatting climate change, as voted on by a coalition of
environmental groups.4 More tangibly, Canada is the first—and
only—State to formally withdraw its Kyoto Protocol (“KP”)
ratification.5 Explaining this may not require us to look much further
than Canada’s extensive oil sand reserves, which are one of the most
controversial unconventional oil and gas developments in the world.
On February 24, 2015, United States President Barack Obama
exercised his executive authority to veto a bill from Congress that

1. See R. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, 125 D.L.R. (4th) 385, ¶ 55
(Can.).
2. See Ban Ki-moon, We are the last generation that can fight climate change. We have
a duty to act, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2015/jan/12/last-generation-tackle-climate-change-un-international-community.
3. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 31, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 849 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
4. See Canada Wins ‘Lifetime Underachievement’ Fossil Award at Warsaw Climate
Talks, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK CANADA (Nov. 22, 2013), http://climateactionnetwork.ca/
2013/11/22/canada-wins-lifetime-unachievement-fossil-award-at-warsaw-climate-talks/.
5. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
37 I.L.M. 22 (1997), Dec. 10, 1997 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; see also Canada’s
Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, ENVIRONMENT CANADA (Jun. 19, 2013), http://www.ec.
gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&n=EE4F06AE-1&xml=EE4F06AE-13EF-453B-B633
-FCB3BAECEB4F&offset=3&toc=show [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT CANADA].
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would have authorized the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline.6
This is another significant blow to the much-maligned project. First
proposed in 2005 by TransCanada, the Keystone XL pipeline
contemplates additions to existing pipeline infrastructure that, if fully
implemented, would carry approximately 1.3 million barrels per day
of light and/or heavy crude from Alberta’s oil sands to two
termination points: Port Arthur, Texas; and Steele City, Nebraska.7 In
invoking his veto, President Obama identified the bill’s conflict with
executive procedures and the need to further investigate whether
Keystone XL serves national interests.8 As 2015 progresses, those
interested in the legal response to anthropogenic climate change will
remain keenly focused on any progress being made by the
international community on the road to UNFCCC COP 21 in Paris,
where it is expected that the international community will agree to a
comprehensive successor to the KP.
Sustainable development demands that we balance the
economic, social, and environmental dimensions of any proposed
development with the normative objective of enabling society to
pursue “development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”9 Keystone XL is just one example of the conflation of fossil
fuels, climate change, and sustainability and of the difficult decisions
that must be made regarding our continued reliance upon nonrenewable resources; considerations that will inevitably dominate the
negotiations in Paris. For the purposes of this Article, the events
described above serve as an appropriate entrance point to a discussion
of prominent gaps in Canada’s climate change response, namely
international inaction and domestic reluctance to regulate the oil and
gas industry at the national scale.
The focus of this Article is one fairly narrow question that
lingers in the Canadian context: can the readily identifiable gaps in
Canada’s national response to climate change be closed through the
6. Juliet Eilperin & Katie Zezmia, Obama Vetoes Keystone XL Bill, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/02/24/key
stone-xl-bill-a-k-a-veto-bait-heads-to-presidents-desk/.
7. Mike Patton, The Truth About the Keystone XL Pipeline, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2014/11/24/the-truth-about-the-keystone-xl-pipeline/.
8. Eilperin, supra note 6.
9. NGO Committee on Education, Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development: Our Common Future ¶ 1 (1987) transmitted to the General Assembly as an
Annex to, document A/42/427.
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use of strategic litigation? Ultimately, this analysis posits that while
litigation in its various forms is a valuable point of intervention that,
to date, has been underutilized in the Canadian context, it is unlikely
that a court would, even in the absence of a clear American-style
Political Questions Doctrine, choose to weigh in on and/or order the
sort of relief required to close the gaps in Canada’s national strategy.
While this conclusion may be unsatisfactory for those interested in
securing an immediate robust climate change response from Canada’s
federal government, it does highlight the fact that changes are
occurring and that litigation represents one of many important steps
along the way towards a sustainable future.
This Article is organized into five parts. Part I situates Canada’s
climate change experience. In Part II, Canada’s regulatory response to
climate change and its gaps are positioned within a troubling ongoing
federal retreat from the environmental arena that seems to favor
resource extraction and export. Parts III to V discuss the possibility
for increased human rights-based climate litigation in the Canadian
context—even in light of past failures—and consider an emerging
public law approach. The Article concludes by commenting on the
prospect of the climate change problem playing out in Canadian
courts.
I. THE CANADIAN CLIMATE CHANGE EXPERIENCE
Canada does not lead the world in absolute quantity of
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions10 nor is it positioned as one of the
most vulnerable nations to the consequences of climate change. It is,
however, host to one of the most contentious unconventional oil
reserves in the world, and is currently experiencing quantifiable
climate change-related impacts. This Part addresses each of these
features of Canada’s climate change experience in turn.
Known as the oil sands or, less affectionately as the tar sands,
this natural mixture of sand, clay, other minerals, water, and
bitumen—a heavy, viscous form of oil—is found in the northern
10. For example, in 2011 Canada was only responsible for 1.6% of total global
emissions. See Environment Canada, Canada’s Emissions Trend 3 (2014) http://ec.gc.ca/gesghg/e0533893-a985-4640-b3a2-008d8083d17d/etr_e%202014.pdf [hereinafter Canada’s
Emissions Trend]. Still, Canada leads the world in per capita emissions. See Mengpin Ge,
Johannes Friedrich & Thomas Domassa, 6 Graphs Explain the World’s Top 10 Emitters,
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Nov. 25, 2014) http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphsexplain-world’s-top-10-emitters.
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portion of the province of Alberta.11 Sand bearing oil is not unique to
Canada as similar-type reserves can be found in the United States,
Venezuela, and Russia; however, the Canadian oil sands are distinct
in their size. They contain some 168 billion barrels of oil, making this
the third largest proven crude reserve in the world.12
The oil sands have gained international notoriety for their energy
potential and for their pollution. From an economic standpoint, this
reserve is Canada’s economic engine. The Canadian Energy Research
Institute estimates that between 2014-2038, oil sands production will
result in: over CAD$2,484 billion in revenue from existing and
projected projects; a total Canadian Gross Domestic Product impact
of CAD$3,865 billion; a peak employment rate of 820,000 jobs; some
CAD$574 billion in federal tax monies; and approximately CAD$600
billion in royalties for the province of Alberta over the next 25
years.13
While there are various significant environmental concerns
associated with oil sands development, chief among them is the
intensity of GHG emissions from surface mining and in situ
extraction techniques used to access the bitumen and the subsequent
upgrading required to transform bitumen into a usable type of fuel.
The Pembina Institute’s14 summary of existing literature suggests that
oil sands extraction and upgrading is 3.2-4.5 times more GHG
intensive, per barrel, than conventional crude from Canada or the
United States and that over its ‘well-to-wheels’ lifecycle, oil sands
GHG emission intensity is 8-37% greater than conventional crude.15
Other studies have focused on the uncertainties associated with

11. What is Oil Sands, ALBERTA ENERGY (last accessed Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.
energy.gov.ab.ca/oilsands/793.asp; Facts and Statistics, ALBERTA ENERGY (last accessed Apr.
9, 2015), http://www.energy.alberta.ca/oilsands/791.asp.
12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
13. CANADIAN ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CANADIAN ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF NEW
AND EXISTING OIL SANDS DEVELOPMENT IN ALBERTA (2014-2038) ix-x (2014) available at
http://www.ceri.ca/images/stories/CDN_Economic_Impacts_of_New_and_Existing_Oil_Sand
s_Development_in_Alberta_-_November_2014_-_Final.pdf.
14. About Pembina, PEMBINA INSTITUTE http://www.pembina.org/about/about-pembina
(last visited Apr. 9, 2015) (explaining that it is an “organization unlike any other working to
protect Canada’s environment today. We combine the research and technical capacity of a
think tank with the values and advocacy of an environmental non-governmental organization
(NGO) and the entrepreneurial and business sense of a for-profit consulting firm.”).
15. Oilsands 101: Climate Impacts, PEMBINA INSTITUTE http://www.pembina.org/oilsands/os101/climate (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
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estimating oil sands GHG lifecycles, concluding that additional
research and improved methodologies are required.16
The most recent consideration of oil sands’ emissions was
published in the renowned journal Nature. Authored by McGlade and
Ekins of the University College London, Institute for Sustainable
Resources, this Article considers the extent to which known oil and
gas reserves should remain unused and unburned if we hope to limit
global warming to two degrees Celsius.17 Their modeling exercise
concludes that: “globally, a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves
and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves should remain unused
from 2010 to 2050.”18 It also indicates that meeting this target
requires leaving the lion’s share of Canada’s oil sands in the ground:
Regarding the production of unconventional oil, open-pit mining
of natural bitumen in Canada soon drops to negligible levels after
2020 in all scenarios because it is considerably less economic
than other methods of production. Production by in situ
technologies continues in the 2 °C scenario that allows CCS
[carbon capture and storage], but this is accompanied by a rapid
and total decarbonization of the auxiliary energy inputs required.
Although such a decarbonization would be extremely challenging
in operation, cumulative production of Canadian bitumen is still
only 7.5 billion barrels. 85% of its 48 billion barrels of bitumen
reserves this remain unburnable if the 2 °C limit is not to be
exceeded. When CCS is not available, all bitumen production
ceases by 2040. In both cases, the RURR [remaining ultimately
recoverable resources] of Canadian bitumen dwarfs cumulative
production, so that around 99% of our estimate of its resources
(640 billion barrels), remains unburnable.19

The reality is that the world is likely trending to pass the two
degrees Celsius limit scenario that has been held on to as a best-case
scenario.20 An absence of consensus regarding the ultimate extent of
global warming does not prevent investigation into its on-going
16. Alex Charpentier, Joule Bergerson & Heather MacLean, Understanding the
Canadian Oil Sands Industry's Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETT. 1, 9-11
(2009).
17. Christopher McGlade & Paul Ekins, The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels
Unused when Limiting Global Warming to 2 °C, 517 NATURE 187, 187 (2015).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 190.
20. IPCC, 2013: Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Stocker, et al. eds.).
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effects. Natural Resources Canada, a department of the federal
government, was the lead contributor on a recent assessment report
titled Canada in a Changing Climate: Sector Perspectives on Impacts
and Adaptation.21 Published in 2014, and contributed to by some 90
authors and 115 expert reviewers, this synthesis of 1500 publications
offers a sobering account of the extent of the on-going effects of
climate change-related changes.22 While it is beyond the scope of this
Article to recount these changes in full, this synthesis is clear that
Canada’s air temperature, precipitation patterns, cryosphere, and
ocean climate have all been impacted and altered by anthropogenic
climate change.23
Moreover, it is clear that Canada’s Arctic region, where
“warming [is] amplified compared to the global average,” is
disproportionately affected.24 These changes are predicted to
significantly impact the health and wellbeing of the more than 50,000
Inuit “who live in small, remote, mostly coastal communities
scattered across approximately 31% of the country’s landmass.”25
Consider the following assessment of direct threats to health and
wellbeing:
. . . numerous health implications from climate change have
already been documented, including the effects on personal
safety, food and water security, and mental health. Changing
temperature and precipitation regimes are projected to increase
the probability, duration, and severity of extreme weather events
and their outcomes (e.g., flooding, erosion) with implications for
water quality, while creating newly hospitable environments for
encroaching or introduced pathogens. Warmer, wetter seasons
also have the potential to increase the risk and incidence of
waterborne, foodborne, zoonotic, and vector borne diseases (e.g.,
Escherchia coli, campylobacteriosis, giardiasis, botulism,
echinococcosis).26
21. FJ WARREN & DS LEMMEN, EDS., CANADA IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: SECTOR
PERSPECTIVES ON IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION (2014) [hereinafter CANADA IN A CHANGING
CLIMATE].
22. Canada in a Changing Climate: Sector Perspectives on Impacts and Adaptation,
NATURAL RESOURCES CANADA, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/environment/resources/publications/
impacts-adaptation/reports/assessments/2014/16309.
23. CANADA IN A CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 21, at 25-57.
24. Id. at 37.
25. James D. Ford, et al., Adapting to the Effects if Climate Change on Inuit Health, 104
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e9, e9 (2014).
26. Id.

1378 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1371
Canada may not be the world’s top emitter or most vulnerable
State, but it is clearly positioned as a significant contributor to climate
change and is definitely not immune to its affects. Canada’s status as
a developed democratic State would tend to suggest that it is well
positioned to take a leadership role in responding to this collective
threat; however, recent trends demonstrate otherwise.
II. RECENT TRENDS IN CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Justice LaForest of the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”)
reminded us in Canada v. Hydro Quebec that: “…the protection of
the environment is a major challenge of our time. It is an international
problem, one that requires action by governments at all levels.”27
Despite this recognition, the Canadian Constitution is silent with
respect to the jurisdictional division of authority over the
environment. This is not surprising given that the drafters of the
British North America Act, 1867 (re-named the Constitution Act,
186728 in 1982) were not exposed to today’s myriad of environmental
problems. That said, the text clearly demonstrates that Canada’s
bountiful natural resources and issues involving trade were at the
forefront during negotiations. Part VI (the “Distribution of Legislative
Powers”) provides the federal Parliament with legislative authority
over “Navigation and Shipping” and “Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries”
and the provinces with exclusivity respecting “exploration for nonrenewable natural resources in the province;” “development,
conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources;”
and “development, conservation and management of [electrical
generation and production] sites.”29
Authority is further complicated by the fact that municipal
governments have also asserted some environmental regulatory
power. Municipalities are not constitutionally recognized and derive
their rule-making authority from provincial enabling legislation. Still,
the SCC has confirmed the legitimacy of their contribution.30 There
is, of course, additional gloss and jurisprudential consideration of the
scope and limit of these sections; however, this brief introduction is
27. Canada (Procureure générale) c. Hydro-Québéc, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, ¶ 296 (Can.).
28. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II,
no. 5 (Can.).
29. Id.
30. 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2
S.C.R. 241, ¶ 3 (Can.).
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sufficient for the purposes of understanding recent developments
relevant to Canada’s regulatory approach to climate change.
A. Federal Withdrawal from the Environmental Arena and
Exporting Bitumen
This section introduces two recent developments that bear
directly on the status of Canada’s regulatory response to climate
change. The first is the general and ongoing retreat of the federal
government from the environmental arena and the second is persistent
efforts to export Alberta’s bitumen.
The federal government’s significant environmental regulatory
withdrawal has taken a number of forms. The first and most
significant manifestation was Parliament’s passage of two omnibus
budget bills.31 These omnibus bills have both primarily focused on
budgetary issues but, and as their name suggests, budgetary issues
have simply provided the core issue around which wide and
seemingly disparate reforms to existing statutory law have also been
made.32 Long-standing federal environmental laws were significantly
impacted and, now that the dust has settled, it is clear that these
amendments have had, inter alia, the following effects: (i) the scope
and form of the federal environmental impact process has been rewritten to significantly diminish the number of projects that will
require federal assessment and to bolster the role of the provinces in
this regard;33 (ii) a significant section of the Fisheries Act that sought
to protect fish habitat from permanent disruption or destruction has
been narrowed in favor of focusing on the management of existing
fisheries;34 and (iii) the Navigable Waters Protection Act, which had
evolved over time to ensure both environmental and navigation
protection for Canada’s watercourses, was amended to significantly
31. Jobs and Growth Act, 2012, S.C. 2012 (Can.), c. 31; Jobs, Growth and Long-Term
Prosperity Act, S.C. 2012, c. 19 (Can.).
32. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, http://www.parl.gc.ca/marleaumontpetit/Document
Viewer.aspx?Sec=Ch16&Seq=4&Language=E (last visited June 13, 2015).
33. The new federal environmental assessment process is found in Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012, c. 19 (Can.). For an analysis of the impact of
these reforms, see Robert B. Gibson, In Full Retreat: the Canadian government’s new
environmental assessment law undoes decades of progress, 30 IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND
PROJECT APPRAISAL 179 (2012).
34. Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14. For an analysis of the impact of these reforms,
see Jeffrey A. Hutchings, Gutting Canada’s Fisheries Act: No Fishery, No Fish Habitat
Protection, 38 FISHERIES 497 (2013).
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reduce its environmental contribution and to also very significantly
limit the number of watercourses that the amended scheme applies
to.35 In sum, these sweeping amendments have signaled the federal
government’s willingness to diminish its regulatory role—even in
areas that have not, at least recently, been subject to jurisdictional
scrutiny—in the name of economic efficiency.
A second form this retreat has taken is executive inaction. This is
more subtle than omnibus reform but still significant. The most
pertinent example is systemic ministerial delinquency pursuant to
Canada’s Species at Risk Act (“SARA”).36 SARA helps implement
Canada’s international commitments under the Convention on
Biological Diversity37 and operates “ . . . to prevent wildlife species
from becoming extirpated or becoming extinct, to provide for the
recovery of wildlife species that are extirpated, endangered or
threatened as a result of human activity and to manage species of
special concern to prevent them from becoming endangered or
threatened.”38 SARA creates an independent and science-based body
called the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada
(“COSEWIC”) for classifying species considered to be at risk and the
Minister of the Environment is charged with acting upon the resulting
risk-assessment by recommending to the Governor in Council that the
species be included on Schedule 1 of SARA, not listed, or returned to
COSEWIC for re-assessment. Once listed on Schedule 1, SARA is
clear: the competent Minister must prepare a proposed, and then final,
recovery strategy in accordance with timelines prescribed by law.
Importantly, recovery strategies are meant to identify the habitat that
is deemed critical for listed species, and this habitat is then to be
protected in accordance with SARA’s requirements.
In Western Canada Wilderness Committee et al v. Minister of
Fisheries and Minister of the Environment,39 a group of public
interest litigants pursued judicial review of Ministerial inaction and
35. Navigation Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-22. For an analysis of the impact of
these reforms, see Kimberly Shearon, Breaking down yet another attack on Canada’s
environmental laws, ECOJUSTICE, Feb. 17, 2015, available at http://www.ecojustice.ca/
breaking-down-yet-another-attack-on-canadas-environmental-laws/.
36. Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c. 29 (Can.) [hereinafter SARA].
37. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992), 1760
U.N.T.S. 79.
38. SARA, supra note 36, at s. 6.
39. Western Canada Wilderness Committee et al. v. Minister of Fisheries and Oceans
and Minister of the Environment, 2014 FC 148 (Can.) [hereinafter Western Canada Wilderness
Committee].
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delays in producing the recovery strategies required under SARA at
the Federal Court of Canada. Specifically, they sought declaratory
relief and orders of mandamus compelling the production of recovery
strategies for four target species: the Nechako White Sturgeon; the
Pacific Humpback Whale; the Marbled Murrelet; and the Southern
Mountain Caribou. The court noted that while the commencement of
litigation prompted the Ministers to initiate the recovery strategy
process, in each case the “recovery strategy was published several
years after the expiry of the relevant statutory timeline.”40 The Court
granted the application for judicial review, characterized the
Ministerial inaction as “egregious,”41 and declared that the Ministers’
failure to comply with the statutory timelines was unlawful.42 This
decision also revealed the true extent of the problem given the
“acknowledgement that there remain some 167 species at risk for
which recovery strategies have not yet been developed. In this regard
it is noteworthy that the Ministers acknowledge that they have not
complied with the timelines for the preparation and posting of
proposed recovery strategies for any of the other 167 species.”43
Finally, the third form that this retreat has taken has been a
general withdrawal from meaningful participation and cooperation in
international efforts to combat climate change. Canada is a member
State to the UNFCCC that signed the KP in 1998 and then ratified it
in 2002. Canada’s targeted reduction was 6% compared to a 1990
baseline, achieved by 2012. These international commitments were
made under a Liberal government, and were inherited by the
Conservative government than came to power in 2006. Subsequently,
the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act (“KPIA”)44 was introduced as
a Private Member’s Bill in 2007 and passed through Parliament
because, at this time, it was a minority Conservative government. The
KPIA envisaged the production of future plans that would enable
compliance, but this approach seemed doomed from its outset. First,
as a Private Member’s Bill, the KPIA was not able to allocate public
expenditures to climate change mitigation and second, it quickly
40. Id. at ¶ 4.
41. Id. at ¶ 6.
42. Id. at ¶¶ 93-94 (the court declined to issue mandamus relief as the relevant
departments had begun creating the necessary plans at the time the case was heard. The court
retained jurisdiction with respect to revisiting the need for further enforcement in the event of
noncompliance).
43. Id. at ¶ 85.
44. Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, S.C. 2007, c. 30 (Can.) (repealed).
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became apparent that the Conservative government did not intend to
fulfill Canada’s international obligations.45 Once the Conservatives
achieved a majority government in 2011, Canada formally withdrew
from the KP and repealed the KPIA.46 This Article will return to these
actions in due course when exploring failed attempts to litigate
climate change.
The retreat outlined above has occurred during a time when
Canada has furiously and actively been seeking new trading partners
for Alberta’s bitumen. The Keystone XL pipeline may have attracted
the most international attention, but other significant and
controversial pipeline proposals are ongoing. For example,
Enbridge’s Northern Gateway pipeline seeks to connect the oils sands
with a port at Kitimat, British Columbia, and Kinder Morgan’s Trans
Mountain pipeline expansion that dramatically increases the amount
of bitumen that is transported from the oil sands to Burnaby, British
Columbia.
Arguably, one of the aims of the federal retreat has been to
facilitate the approval and development of bitumen exports. For
example, the amendments to long-standing federal environmental
laws likely reduced the federal bureaucracy and approvals
process associated with planning, developing, and constructing
the necessary pipeline infrastructure. Similarly, the four species
selected by the public interest applicants in Western Canada
Wilderness Committee et al were strategically chosen based on
the impact of their critical habitat not being identified and
protected. As the court noted: The applicants are particularly
concerned that the critical habitat of the four species is at risk
from industrial development affecting the coast of British
Columbia. As an example, the applicants cite Enbridge’s
proposed Northern Gateway pipeline development project which,
they say, will have a negative impact on all four of the species at
issue in these applications. I do not understand the respondents to
take issue with this proposition, although they do deny that
recovery strategies have been intentionally delayed in order to
facilitate industrial development.47

Finally, the case can be made that Canada’s relative inaction
with respect to federal climate change regulation and its
45. Peter Stoett, Canada, Kyoto and the Conservatives: Thinking/Moving Ahead,
WILSON CENTER (2011), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/paperstoett1.pdf.
46. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5; see also ENVIRONMENT CANADA, supra note 5.
47. Western Canada Wilderness Committee, supra note 39, at ¶ 57.
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disassociation from the international process can be explained by the
current emphasis on oil sands development, since meeting stringent
international targets would require new regulatory controls exerted
over the oil and gas industry. With this survey of the present retreat in
mind, it is now appropriate to consider the scope of Canada’s existing
regulatory climate change response.
B. Canada’s Current Regulatory Response to Climate Change
and its Lingering Gaps
Since 2009, Canada’s national regulatory climate change
response has been aligned with that of the United States in at least
two significant ways.48 First, both States voluntarily pledged pursuant
to the Cancun Agreements concluded at UNFCCC COP 16 to reduce
their total annual economy-wide GHG emissions by 17% relative to a
2005 baseline, by 2020.49 Second, Canada’s federal government has
opted to utilize America’s sector-by-sector GHG emission reduction
strategy, noting that “[g]iven the highly integrated North American
economy, the Government of Canada is aligning its climate change
approach with that of the United States, as appropriate for Canadian
circumstances.”50 There is nothing wrong, per se, with pursuing a
sector-by-sector regulatory approach to climate change, but this is
premised on the assumption that such an approach does not exclude
the most significant contributing sector(s), thereby frustrating
effective action.
The federal pursuit of sector-by-sector GHG regulation is part of
its overarching Clean Air Agenda51 and has taken a few forms. First,

48. This alignment has been fostered by the Clean Energy Dialogue (“CED”) concluded
between President Obama and Prime Minister Harper in February 2009. The CED coordinates
interaction between high-ranking officials from both States, and primarily targets the
development of strategies and action plans that clean energy production, distribution and use.
See United States-Canada Clean Energy Dialogue, CANADA’S ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.climatechange.gc.ca/dialogue/default.asp?lang=Enn=E47AAD1
C-1.
49. Reducing Canada’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENVIRONMENT CANADA (Feb. 15,
2013), http://www.ec.gc.ca/dd-sd/default.asp?lang=En&n=AD1B22FD-1 (this voluntary target
operates in the absence of any legally binding reduction target that would have been
established for Canada pursuant to the second implementation phase of the KP).
50. Id.
51. Id. (this policy was most recently revisited in 2011 and, as it currently stands, exists
as a conglomerate that comprises “initiatives to reduce GHGs and improve air quality;
advances in innovation for clean energy and transportation, and for improved indoor air
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six GHGs were listed as toxic substances on Schedule 1 of the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (“CEPA, 1999”) in
2005,52 and this listing enabled federal regulation of emissions from
coal-fired electrical generation as an exercise of federal criminal law
power.53 Second, and also pursuant to CEPA, 1999, the federal
government exercised its authority to regulate interprovincial and
international trade to establish vehicle emission standards for
passenger automobiles and light trucks54 and heavy-duty vehicles.55
Regulatory standards have also been set for renewable fuel content56
and for coal-fired electrical generation.57 Conspicuously absent in this
sectoral response is national regulation of the oil and gas sector. In
2010, the federal Conservative government promised to regulate the
oil and gas sector and to achieve the reductions pledged at
Copenhagen.58 On December 14, 2014, and in response to a question
posed by a member of the official opposition regarding the
government’s decision to break its promise to regulate the oil and gas
sector, Prime Minister Harper stated to Parliament that: “frankly, Mr.
Speaker, under the current circumstances of the oil and gas sector, it
would be crazy, it would be crazy economic policy to do unilateral
penalties on that sector. We’re clearly not going to do that.”59
The absence of federal oil and gas regulatory standards will
figure prominently in determining whether Canada meets its
voluntary Copenhagen commitment to achieve a 17% reduction
below 2005 emission levels by 2020, which translates into an
emissions budget of 611 megatons (“Mt”) in 2020.60 Environment
quality; [mechanisms] helping Canadians adapt to climate change; and, engagement with
international partners”).
52. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33.
53. Penny Becklumb, Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction to Regulate Environmental
Issues 5-6 (2013), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2013
-86-e.pdf.
54. Id.; Regulations Amending the Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse
Gas Emission Regulations, SOR/2010-201.
55. Heavy-duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations, SOR/201324.
56. Renewable Fuels Regulations, SOR/2010-189.
57. Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-fired Generation of Electricity
Regulations, SOR/2012-167.
58. Robert Madondo, Harper Breaks Promise to Regulate Oil and Gas Emissions, THE
CANADIAN PROGRESSIVE (Dec. 9, 2014), available at http://www.canadianprogressiveworld.
com/2014/12/09/harper-breaks-promise-regulate-oil-gas-emissions/.
59. Id.
60. Canada’s Emissions Trend, supra note 10, at 18.
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Canada’s most recent assessment of Canada’s progress clearly
indicates that the current regulatory approach is insufficient.
Specifically, while current measures are predicted to account for some
130 Mt in annual reductions by 2020, this will only secure an annual
emission budget of 727 Mt, which falls some 116 Mt short.61 This
assessment is clear that while emission reductions will occur in many
sectors, “increased production in Canada’s oil sands is expected to
drive a rise in emissions from the oil and gas sector of 45 Mt (28%
[increase]) between 2005 and 2020.”62
It is apparent that Canada’s current regulatory response to
climate change mitigation is deficient. In short, its two major gaps
are: (i) that the federal executive decision to withdraw from the KP
further solidifies Canada’s position as an international outlier and
ineffective participant, which ultimately calls into question Canada’s
willingness to contribute or participate towards securing a new,
comprehensive agreement by the conclusion of 2015; and (ii) that the
federal government’s decision to exclude the oil and gas sector from
national regulatory control means that achieving even voluntarily
commitments is unlikely. The remainder of this Article will turn to
consider whether or not litigation can play a meaningful role in
helping fill these gaps.
III. WHY LITIGATION?
Arguably, the best-case scenario for Canadian climate change
regulation remains a comprehensive national emission reduction
61. Id. at 18 (interestingly, Environment Canada recently released its post-2020 GHG
reduction target, seeking a 30% reduction below 2005 levels by 2030, see Press Release,
Government of Canada, Government of Canada Announces 2030 Emissions Target (May 15,
2015), available at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=974959). The probability of
attaining this target is similarly compromised by the absence of comprehensive regulations for
the oil and gas sector.
62. Id. at 16 (this increase will occur despite Alberta’s provincial response to regulating
oil and gas emissions. Alberta’s approach is focused on emissions intensity from large
industrial emitters. Specifically, it requires those industrial emitters that contribute more than
100,000 tons of GHGs annually to achieve a 12% increase in emission efficiency over a set
time period. In other words, there is no prescribed limit on the overall quantity of GHGs that
can be reduced; rather, it is the amount of GHG per unit of production that must be enhanced
over time. While this strategy does aim to reduce emissions by 50 Mt by 2020, the record
suggests that this result is unlikely. This approach is prescribed by the Climate Change and
Emissions Management Act, S.A. 2003, c. 16.7 and the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation,
Alta. Reg. 139/2007). For a summary, see Alberta and Climate Change, ALBERTA
ENVIRONMENT AND PARKS (Feb. 10, 2015), http://esrd.alberta.ca/focus/alberta-and-climatechange/default.aspx.
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strategy that includes all major industries and is designed and
implemented in a manner that demonstrates fidelity to negotiated
international standards. It is clear that Canada is far from this bestcase scenario and, as the trends identified above suggest, it is
seemingly moving further in the opposite direction.
The principle of sustainable development and, by extension, its
associated sustainability movement, both seem clear that globally
coordinated action in the face of the progressive destruction of the
global commons, including the Earth’s atmosphere, is necessary to
secure the balance, longevity, and intra- and inter-generational
equities upon which they are premised. Both sustainable development
and the sustainability movement also contain considerable room for
sub-national contributions including local innovation and even
individual action. Viewed this way, it is clear that the challenges
presented by the federal government’s retreat from the environmental
arena can also present an opportunity for sub-national governance
structures, administrative agencies, municipalities, and even
individuals to experiment and innovate with novel climate change
mitigation strategies.
Climate change is clearly a matter of collective responsibility in
that we all impacted by the consequences of climate change and, to
some extent, are all to blame. At the State level, this is represented by
the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility, as
articulated in the UNFCCC, which attempts to parse out the level of
responsibility for climate change and the corresponding obligation to
respond.63 This exercise ultimately identifies those developed nations
that have benefitted from carbon-intensive industrialization as bearing
primary responsibility to lead mitigation efforts and facilitate
deviation from this industrialization process.64

63. The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility, as articulated in the
UNFCCC, clearly captures this at the State level. Art 3(1) states: “The Parties should protect
the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis
of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”
64. This traditional conception of CBDR will likely have to bend if the global
community is to successfully engage cooperation between today’s top emitting States, since
they are a mixture of developed and developing States that do not neatly fit into this
categorization.
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There is a growing body of literature that argues in favor of an
individual’s moral responsibility to combat climate change.65 This
emerging ethical responsibility can be organized around recognized
dimensions of individual morality, such as the ethical obligation to
avoid harming others, to avoid risking harm to others, or contributing
to the risk of harming others.66 The individual or community reaction
to this responsibility can take many forms as experimentation and
innovation can manifest in a number of ways. At one level, it is open
to individuals to exercise their citizenship within prevailing
democratic structures and to vote for those politicians who prioritize
climate change action. At a different level, individuals can exercise
personal autonomy and choose to reduce their own carbon footprint
through green lifestyle choices, including consumer decisions,
commuter decisions, and energy efficiency decisions. Finally,
individuals can contribute to education and awareness initiatives,
participate in community organizing, or engage in public
demonstrations or acts of non-violent civil disobedience. Each of the
above described actions qualify as a sustainability intervention—
defined here as an action taken by a citizen or group of citizens in the
face of perceived government failure with the goal of moving society
(locally, regionally, or globally) towards a more sustainable state. To
date, these interventions have failed to secure the necessary
governmental response67 and, consequently, it is necessary to consider
the suitability of a more significant intervention.
In 2009, Professors William Burns and Hari Osofsky observed in
Adjudicating Climate Change, that “[o]ver the course of the last few
years, climate change litigation has been transformed from a creative
lawyering strategy to a major force in transnational regulatory

65. See ELIZABETH CRIPPS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE MORAL AGENT: INDIVIDUAL
DUTIES IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (2013); Marion Hourdequin, Climate Collective
Action and Individual Ethical Obligations, 19(4) Env. Values 443 (2010); STEPHEN
GARDINER, SIMON CAREY, DALE JAMIESON & HENRY SHUE, CLIMATE ETHICS: ESSENTIAL
READINGS (2010).
66. See Walter Sinott-Armstrong, It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual
Moral Obligations, in PERSPECTIVES ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, POLITICS,
ETHICS 293, 297-302 (Walter Sinott-Armstrong & Richard B. Howard, eds., 2006).
67. One persuasive explanation for the failure of citizen action is that there is a
fundamental disconnect between society’s belief that we should act to mitigate climate change
and its understanding of how the climate system works. See Sterman, J. & L. Booth Sweeney,
Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change: Adults' Mental Models of Climate
Change Violate Conservation of Matter, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 213 (2007).
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governance of greenhouse gas emissions.”68 In the face of “regulatory
insufficiency,” professor Osofsky observes that “[t]he combination of
discontent with existing efforts and a wide range of legal mechanisms
applicable to the crosscutting problem [of climate change] make the
courtrooms and other quasi-judicial form important loci for dialogue
among disparate actors across levels of governance about how to
address climate change most appropriately.”69 Osofsky’s point is
premised on the fact that climate change litigation can take various
forms. Claims based in tort, public trust, insurance, indigenous rights,
and existing (or novel) substantive constitutional and/or human right
obligations are all avenues available to prospective litigants.
Assuming that one accepts that an individual has a moral
obligation to combat climate change, the question becomes whether
or not this individual duty is weighty enough to oblige citizens to
pursue litigation. This very question was explored in detail, in the
United States context, by Professor Christopher Brown in A Litigious
Proposal: A Citizen’s Duty to Challenge Climate Change, Lessons
from Recent Federal Standing Analysis, and Possible State-Level
Remedies Private Citizens Can Pursue.70 Here, Brown explores the
unique nature and scope of the climate change crisis in light of
various theoretical critiques against elevating a moral duty in this
way. He is aware of the practical concern that the outcome of
litigation is difficult to predict and highly uncertain and that “the
decision to instigate something as expensive, time-consuming, and
emotionally trying as litigation should be left to the discretion of
would-be litigants,” but asserts that regardless of the ultimate
consequences of such litigation (i.e., its success in combating global
climate change), there is a strong deontological basis that supports
citizens pursuing this course of action.71
Building on this theoretical basis for pursuing litigation, there
are a few other potential benefits associated with this approach. First,
tort-based nuisance claims and other claims seeking damages awards
68. William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, Overview: The Exigencies That Drive
Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 1
(William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, eds., 2009.
69. Hari M. Osofsky, Conclusion: Adjudicating Climate Change Across Scales, in
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE 375, 382 (William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, eds.,
2009).
70. Christopher Brown, A Litigious Proposal: A Citizen’s Duty to Challenge Climate
Change, Lessons from Recent Federal Standing Analysis, 25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 385 (2010).
71. Id. at 387, 393-94.
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are able to compensate those that have been directly and severely
impacted. Second, successful constitutional or human rights litigation
has the potential to force legislative changes or executive actions, the
benefits of which ultimately extend beyond those directly engaged in
the litigation.72 In theory, successful litigation of this sort could
prompt the action needed to close the existing gaps in Canada’s
climate change strategy.
A major difficulty of realizing these benefits is that those
individuals whose rights are most significantly impacted by climate
change and who are, therefore, in the best position to successfully
advance the sort of litigation, are likely from a socio-economic strata
that would be disproportionately impacted by the economic and
personal costs associated with litigation. As the Canadian climate
change experience demonstrates, this likely means those Inuit peoples
in Canada’s far north who are most vulnerable to climate change also
bear the weightiest moral obligation to pursue litigation.
Environmental justice recognizes that those within a lower
socioeconomic-status are disproportionately exposed to the negative
consequences of environmental degradation and demands that the
costs of degradation be equally and equitably re-distributed.
Arguably, requiring these vulnerable individuals to accept an
additional moral responsibility to pursue litigation is highly
inequitable and unjust. Put another way, is this not analogous to
arguing that the CBDR principle that helps guide the international
climate change response ought to be reformulated in a manner that
shifts the onus from developed States to developing States, since they
are experiencing the most significant effects of climate change? It is
the position of this Article that the potential benefits of successful
litigation are so significant that this option ought not to be frustrated
by this concern. Rather, it falls to the environmental nongovernmental organization community and not-for profit or charitable
public interest law organizations73 to work together to identify and

72. Id. at 405 (juxtaposing the potential benefits of successful litigation with the benefits
gained from individual lifestyle changes, noting that “a successful citizen suit could have a
different impact than the efforts of individuals to change their daily habits to decrease carbon
emissions—not in the ultimate sense of solving the problem—but nevertheless significant”).
73. Ecojustice is the primary Canadian organization positioned to take the lead. The
organization’s website asserts: “Ecojustice is leading the legal fight for a brighter
environmental future. We are Canada’s only national environmental law charity. We are 100%
donor-funded and have a 25-year track record of winning legal victories for people and the
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pursue strategic climate change-oriented litigation in a manner that
institutionalizes and thereby alleviates some of the individual stress
associated with this moral obligation. Certain individuals and groups
in Canada have already accepted this obligation and have taken to the
courts to litigate climate change. The following Part explores why
these attempts have been unsuccessful and builds towards the
assessment of whether other approaches have a chance of succeeding
in light of these failures.
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION WITH CANADIAN
CONTENT
Canada is not devoid of climate change litigation, but the
Canadian experience pales in comparison to the United States
litigation track record.74 This section first introduces two international
human rights petitions that engaged Canadian citizens and then turns
to existing domestic Canadian jurisprudence.
A. Petitions to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the
“IACHR”) is an autonomous regional human rights body that exists
under the Organization of American States.75 Two petitions that claim
human rights violations based climate change impacts have been
lodged at the IACHR; both include Canadian Inuit petitioners.
The first petition was lodged against the United States by the
Inuit Circumpolar Council (the “ICC,” then known as the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference) on December 7, 2005.76 This petition
alleged that the United States, as the world’s largest GHG emitter,
violated a number of human rights of the Arctic’s Inuit residents,
including the rights to culture, property, life and security, health,
planet.” See Who We Are, ECOJUSTICE, https://www.ecojustice.ca/approach/ (last visited June
22, 2015).
74. Michael B. Gerrard, J. Cullen Howe & L. Margaret Barry, Climate Change
Litigation in the U.S., ARNOLD & PORTER LLP (June 1, 2015), http://www.arnoldporter.com/
resources/documents/ClimateChangeLitigationChart.pdf (providing a 769-page summary of
existing climate change-related litigation in the United States).
75. What is the IACHR?, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES http://www.oas.org/en/
iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
76. Shelia Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights
Seeking Relief From Violations Resulting From Global Warming Caused by Acts and
Omissions of the United States (2005), available at http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/uploads/
3/0/5/4/30542564/finalpetitionicc.pdf.
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subsistence and inviolability of the home.77 The petitioners sought,
amongst other remedies and in light of a declaration that Inuit human
rights were being violated, a recommendation that the United States
establish new mandatory GHG emissions limits, the creation and
implementation of a plan to protect Inuit culture and resources in the
face of the impacts of climate change, and the creation and
implementation of a plan to assist Inuit in adapting to the impacts of
climate change.78
It is striking that the vast majority of petitioners named in the
Inuit Petition—49 of 63—were Canadian Inuit rather than American
Inuit.79 In attempting to hold the United States accountable for a
broad range of alleged human rights violations throughout North
America’s Arctic, Professor Harrington suggests that “the petitioners
ostensibly sought the Commission’s [IACHR’s] approval for a major
extra-territorial extension of the scope of application of an
international human rights without regard to the sovereign interests of
other States in the Arctic, and without support from within
international human rights law for such an extension.”80 The petition
was ultimately rejected by the IACHR on the threshold issue of
admissibility; however, the IACHR did hold a public hearing where
the lawyers representing the ICC and supporting non-governmental
organizations made their legal case to the IACHR in the absence of
the United States or other interested parties.81
The second petition was lodged by the Arctic Athabaskan
Council on April 23, 2013.82 This petition again utilizes both United
States and Canadian petitioners—this time two individuals from each
jurisdiction.83 Canada rather than the United States is the target of this
petition, and while it alleges similar rights violations,84 the nexus
presented by the petitioners is “black carbon, a component of sooty
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 1.
Joanna Harrington, Climate Change, Human Rights, and the Right to be Cold, 18
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV 513, 522 (2006-2007) [hereinafter Harrington].
81. Id. (discussing this public hearing and the implications of proceeding by this sort of
ad hoc process).
82. Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from
Violations of the Rights of Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic Warming
and Melting Caused by Emissions of Black Carbon by Canada (2013), available at
http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/AAC_PETITION_13-04-23a.pdf.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id. at 57-78.
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fine-particle pollution” that is a “potent climate agent” that
disproportionately impacts high latitudes.85 Canada emits 98,000 tons
of black carbon annually,86 and the petition asserts that the many
regulatory measures available to Canada reduce these emissions.
Specifically, Canada could: “require retrofitting [of] the existing fleet
of on-road diesel vehicles with particle traps, which would reduce
black carbon emissions by over 90 percent; eliminate high-emitting
vehicles; require improved efficiency for residential heating with
wood and coal; eliminate most gas flaring; and ban agricultural
biomass burning.”87 The petition requests that the IACHR investigate
the claims, declare Canada’s human rights violations, and recommend
those steps necessary to limit black carbon emissions and protect
Athabaskan culture and resource use.88 No decision on the
admissibility of this petition has been made.
This petition, like the Inuit Petition, seeks extra-territorial
application of human rights principles by utilizing United States
petitioners to challenge Canadian action. Further, while enhanced
regulation of black carbon may be another important step in
comprehensively managing climate change, this petition does not
seek to close either of the two major regulatory gaps identified in this
Article. Further, it must be noted that even if this petition is deemed
admissible and proceeds to an assessment of its merits, the IACHR
lacks capacity to issue a legally binding decision—a feature of this
sort of human rights organization that questions its utility in ever
being able to help fill the sorts of gaps at question here.89
Nevertheless, and regardless of whether the Arctic Athabaskan Claim
is ultimately deemed admissible, the lasting value of these petitions is
their ability to raise the public profile of important aspects of the
climate change discussion.90

85. Id. at 2.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. at 7, 86.
89. See Harrington, supra note 80, at 532 (noting in the context of State consent in the
international legal system and the ability of the IACHR to force the United States to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol, that: “A human rights petition to a non-binding part-time regional body cannot
force a State to ratify a treaty—especially a treaty unrelated to the competence of that
particular body.”).
90. See Harrington, supra note 80, at 521 (noting that “for publicizing the impact of
global warming on the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, the launching of the ICC Petition
receives full marks, but the petition rightly fails on its legal arguments”).
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B. Domestic Canadian Climate Change Litigation
Compared to the IACHR petitions introduced above, litigation
advanced in Canada’s domestic courts seems better suited to help fill
the lingering gaps in Canada’s national climate change strategy. First,
in Friends of the Earth v. The Minister of the Environment, the
applicant, “a Canadian not-for profit organization with a mission to
protect the national and global environment,” brought three
applications for judicial review of executive action pursuant to the
KPIA and sought declaratory and mandatory relief from the Federal
Court that would enforce Canadian compliance with its KP
commitment.91 Then, four years later in Turp v. Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of Canada, the applicant sought judicial review
of the executive decision to withdraw from the KP, alleging that such
an action is “illegal, null, and void as it in violation of the KPIA, the
principle of the rule of law, the principle of the separation of powers,
and the democratic principle.”92 Despite the fact that in both cases the
applicants were unsuccessful and the application for judicial review
was dismissed, certain key takeaways from each decision help inform
the possibility of similar litigation succeeding in the future.
Friends of the Earth turned on statutory interpretation of the
action-forcing sections of the KIPA. Having already introduced the
controversial nature of the KPIA, it is not surprising that its statutory
obligations were less than clear. At its core, the applicants argued that
the KPIA is unambiguous and mandatory in its legal obligations
requiring the government to produce a KP-compliant Climate Action
Plan and to publish proposed regulations within a set time frame and
then ultimately “make, amend or repeal regulations necessary to
ensure that Canada meets its obligations under . . . the Kyoto
Protocol.”93 The Court’s justiciability analysis led it to conclude that
it “has no role to play in reviewing the reasonableness of the
government’s response to Canada’s Kyoto commitments within the
four corners of the KPIA.”94

91. Friends of the Earth v. Canada (Governor in Council), 2008 F.C. 1183, 39 C.E.R.L.
(3d) 191 (Can.) (appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal denied in Friends of the Earth v.
Canada (Governor in Council), 2009 F.C.A. 297).
92. Daniel Turp v. Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, 2012 F.C. 893
(Can.).
93. Friends of the Earth, 2008 F.C. 1183 at ¶¶ 3-6.
94. Id. at ¶ 46.
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Canadian courts do not subscribe to the American Political
Questions doctrine,95 nor does Canada have a strict constitutionally
entrenched separation of powers. Rather, the justiciability analysis
turns on an assessment of whether the issue at hand “possesses a
sufficient legal component to warrant a decision by a court”;96
importantly, this does not preclude “largely political questions.”97 As
one might expect, the question of what is sufficiently legal remain
uncertain as does the level deference required from the courts to the
other branches of government within “Canada’s constitutional matrix
so as not to inappropriately intrude into the spheres reserved to the
other branches.”98 The Court in Friends of the Earth reminds us that
if “either the subject matter of the dispute is inappropriate for judicial
review or . . . the court lacks the capacity” to resolve it, then it is
generally non-justiciable.99 Because the Court dismissed the
application for judicial review, it might be tempting to construe the
Court’s reasoning in Friends of the Earth to conclude that climate
change is now recognized as a non-justiciable issue. Such an
interpretation is erroneous. Rather, Friends of the Earth stands for the
narrower proposition that the KPIA, as drafted, relied on “public,
scientific and political discourse, the subject matter of which is
mostly not amenable or suited to judicial scrutiny” and “public and
Parliamentary accountability” rather than judicial enforcement
through judicial review to move Canada towards KP compliance.
In Turp, the Federal Court was provided with another
opportunity to assess justiciability in the climate change context.
Here, the court was less concerned about whether the duties
contemplated by the KPIA were justiciable and instead focused on the
applicant’s contention that the KIPA rendered Canada’s withdrawal
from the KP illegal and void. It is clear in Canadian constitutional law
that the federal executive has authority to conduct foreign affairs and
95. The Political Questions Doctrine, as originally articulated by Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803), provides that: “Questions, in their
nature political, or which, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never
be made in this court.” This doctrine has always held a close connection to the separation of
powers. For a discussion on Political Questions Doctrine in American climate change
litigation, see Jill Jaffe, The Political Question Doctrine: An Update in Response to Recent
Case Law 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1033 (2011).
96. Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, ¶ 7 (Can.).
97. Id. at ¶ 24.
98. Id. at ¶ 25 (citing to Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003
S.C.C. 62, ¶¶ 33-36 (Can.)).
99. Id.
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international relations and that this authority is rooted in the
executive’s Royal prerogative power. It is also clear that the Royal
prerogative is a vestigial source of authority that can be altered and
even abolished by Parliament. The Court dismissed the applicant’s
argument that the KPIA limited the executive’s Royal prerogative
authority to withdrawal from the KP in accordance with the
mechanism for such action that the treaty itself provides in Article
27.100 The Court also proceeded to dismiss the applicant’s contention
that Canada’s withdrawal violated the constitutional principles of
separation of powers or democracy.101
The fact that domestic litigation has, thus far, been unsuccessful
should not dissuade future litigants from pursuing this course of
action. These decisions, and especially Turp, approach the sort of
actions that could prompt the sort of judicial intervention necessary to
help correct Canada’s climate change trajectory. In addition to the
profile that this litigation can gain for climate change, Friends of the
Earth and Turp have shed light on what is and what isn’t justiciable,
which helps inform the scope of future action from those citizens who
choose to litigate climate change.
IV. POSSIBLE NOVEL APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE
LITIGATION, INCLUDING LITIGATION PURSUANT
TO SECTION 7 OF THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Support for litigating climate change in Canada continues to gain
traction in scholarly literature, if not the courtroom. This progression
can largely be attributed to the fact that Canadian environmental
lawyers, academics, and non-governmental organizations groups are
now pushing to “green” Canada’s Constitution by focusing on the
nexus between environmental rights and existing human rights
framework.102 The human rights linkage to climate change litigation
was introduced earlier in this Article in the discussion of the
Indigenous IACHR petitions, and this approach makes sense given

100. See Daniel Turp v. Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, 2012 F.C.
893 (Can.) at ¶ 25.
101. See id. at ¶¶ 27-31.
102. See Charlie Smith, David Suzuki Aims to Change Canada’s Constitution with Blue
Dot Tour, THE GEORGIA STRAIGHT (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.straight.com/news/760246/
david-suzuki-aims-change-canadas-constitution-blue-dot-tour.
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how climate change and human rights interact.103 As enunciated by
Oliver De Schutter, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to
food:
Climate change represents an enormous threat to a whole host of
human rights: the right to food, the right to water and sanitation,
the right to development. There is therefore huge scope for
human rights court and non-judicial human rights bodies to treat
climate change as the immediate threat to human rights that it is.
Such bodies could therefore take government policy to task when
it is too short-sighted, too unambitious, or too narrowly focused
on its own constituents at the expense of those elsewhere. Fossil
fuel mining, deforestation, the disturbance of carbon sinks, and
the degradation of the oceans are developments that can be
blocked on human rights grounds.104

Before exploring the Canadian human rights-climate change
nexus in more detail, it is important to acknowledge that future
climate change litigation need not be limited to this form. A recent
Canadian policy paper entitled Payback Time? What the
Internationalization of Climate Litigation Could Mean for Canadian
Oil and Gas Companies, authored by lawyer Andrew Gage and
Professor Michael Byers, identifies a number of innovative litigationbased approaches to combating climate change.105 In addition to
recognizing the availability—and controversy—associated with
applying traditional tort principles to the pursuit of climate change
damages,106 Gage and Byers also introduce two other approaches. The
first utilizes recent research on historical emissions to estimate the
corporate exposure for five Canadian companies based on on-going
climate change-related damages in foreign jurisdictions. Based on
this, laws facilitating damages recovery are likely to be enacted in
103. See Marilyn Averill, Linking Climate Litigation and Human Rights, 18 RECIEL
189 (2009) (exploring the advantages and disadvantages of litigating climate change using
human rights).
104. Oilver De Schutter, Climate Change is a Human Rights Issue – and That’s How We
Can Solve It, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 24, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/
apr/24/climate-change-human-rights-issue.
105. Andrew Gage & Michael Byers, Payback Time: What the Internationalization of
Climate Litigation Could Mean for Canadian Oil Companies, WEST COAST ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (Oct. 9, 2014), http://wcel.org/resources/publication/payback-time.
106. Id. at 16-17 (this assessment engages the work of climate researcher Richard Heede
in Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement
Producers, 1854-2010, 122 CLIMATE CHANGE 221 (2014), which has attributed 63% of the
total GHG emissions between 1751 and 2010 to 90 major industrial emitters. Gage and Byers
suggest this apportionment can be used to help address lingering causation concerns).
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developing States where fossil fuel emissions are relatively low and
climate change damage is particularly pronounced, such as Vietnam,
Ghana, and India.107 Damage awards obtained in these countries could
then be enforced as debts in Canada, subject to any conflict of laws
hurdles.108 Second, Canadian provinces could enact a new legislated
liability scheme that creates a cause of action against large industrial
emitters, enabling recovery of public expenditure made to rectify
climate change damage.109 Such schemes could be based on the
approach taken by provinces to recoup the expenses incurred by
public health care because of tobacco product use.110 The SCC
confirmed the constitutional validity of this approach in British
Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd,111 which has since been
adopted in every province.112 These innovative approaches definitely
help drive the climate change litigation discussion but because they
largely focus on damage recovery from corporate polluters, they are
not well-suited to directly challenge the lingering gaps in Canada’s
climate change strategy.
The most promising opportunity to use the courts to prompt
government action to fill these gaps rests with innovative human
rights-based litigation. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(“Charter”)113 has been in force since April 17, 1982 and as a
constitutionally entrenched rights-bearing document it serves to
protect citizens and constrains government action. The Charter is
applicable to all matters that are within the authority of the federal
Parliament or provincial legislatures.114 This analysis is most
interested with the possibility of engaging strategic climate change
litigation using section 7 of the Charter, which provides that:
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and

107. Gage & Byers, supra note 105, at 40-41.
108. Id. at 23-29, 44.
109. Id. at 35.
110. Id. at 34-35.
111. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 73, 2005 SCC
49 (Can.).
112. Gage & Byers, supra note 105, at 35 (noting that despite the availability of this
approach in all the provinces, law suits have only been initiated in British Columbia, Ontario,
and New Brunswick; moreover, tobacco companies have predictably “aggressively” fought
such action despite their constitutionality having been confirmed).
113. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Charter].
114. Id. at s. 32.
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the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.”115
Section 7 is most frequently employed in the criminal law
context but has proved relevant elsewhere, figuring prominently in
recent SCC decisions addressing the constitutionality of private health
care insurance,116 safe injection site restrictions,117 and doctor-assisted
suicide.118 It is primarily perceived as embodying a negative right that
limits State action; however, the SCC has not closed the door to the
possibility that “a positive obligation to sustain life, liberty, or
security of the person may be made out in special circumstances.”119
Moreover, while section 7 is often utilized to challenge legislative
action/inaction it has also been utilized to challenge executive
action/inaction, including discretionary decision-making.120
The two-part test employed to evaluate section 7 claims reads:
“claimants must first show that the law interferes with, or deprives
them of, their life, liberty or security of the person. Once they have
established that section 7 is engaged, they must then show that the
deprivation in question is not in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.”121 With respect to the first part of the test and
the scope of potential rights depravation, existing section 7
jurisprudence recognizes the right to life as the “right, freedom, or
ability to maintain one’s existence,” the right to liberty as crucial and
personal choices that implicate personal independence and dignity,
and the right to security as the recognition of one’s personal
115. Charter, supra note 113.
116. Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 2005 SCC 35 (Can.).
117. Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 SCR
134, 2011 SCC 44 (Can.).
118. Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 (Can.).
119. Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, 2002 SCC 84, ¶ 83
(Can.); see also Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, ¶ 60, where the court observes in the
context of a challenge to Alberta’s provincial human rights legislation, which purposefully did
not include sexual orientation in its prohibited grounds of discrimination: There is nothing in
that wording to suggest that a positive act encroaching on rights is required; rather the
subsection speaks only of matters within the authority of the legislature. Dianne Pothier has
correctly observed that s. 32 is “worded broadly enough to cover positive obligations on a
legislature such that the Charter will be engaged even if the legislature refuses to exercise its
authority” (The Sounds of Silence: Charter Application when the Legislature Declines to
Speak (1996), 7 Constitutional Forum 113 at 115). The application of the Charter is not
restricted to situations where the government actively encroaches on rights.
120. Vriend, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, ¶ 60; PHS Community Services Society, supra note
117, at ¶ 117. Still, it is far less common for section 7 to be used to challenge government
inaction.
121. Carter, supra note 118, at ¶ 55.
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autonomy and physical and psychological integrity.122 With respect to
causation, the SCC has indicated that what is a required is “a
sufficient causal connection between the state-caused [effect] and the
prejudice suffered by the [claimant];” this standard is flexible and
contextual.123 Additionally, it “does not require that the impugned
government action or law be the only or the dominant cause of the
prejudice suffered by the claimant.”124 Turning to the second part of
the test, recent jurisprudence cements that this assessment turns on
whether the impugned action is arbitrary, overbroad, or has
consequences that are grossly disproportionate to its objective.125
Finally, even if both elements can be proved, the government may
still avail itself of the infringement through section 1 of the Charter,
which provides that rights guarantees are “subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.”126 However, section 1 is
infrequently used to validate section 7 violations.127
Perhaps the most tantalizing aspect of pursuing a section 7 claim
against the government in the climate change context is the range of
enforcement remedies available to the court in the event it concludes
that a section 7 violation exists that is not saved by section 1. Section
24(1) of the Charter provides that anyone whose guaranteed rights
have been infringed may apply to the courts to “obtain such remedy
as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances;”128
this includes “damages, costs, declarations, injunctions and other
mandatory remedies,” as appropriate.129 To date, courts have not had
to consider the sort of enforcement remedy that would be appropriate
in an environmental context because every attempt to use section 7 to
challenge environmental harm has been unsuccessful.130 While the
122. DAVID BOYD, THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 178 (2012) (summarizing
the scope of Section 7’s key terminology).
123. Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, 2013 SCC 72, ¶ 75
(Can.) (citing favorably to Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000
SCC 44 (Can.)).
124. Id. at ¶ 76.
125. Carter, 2015 S.C.C. 5 at ¶ 72.
126. Charter, supra note 113, § 1.
127. See BOYD, supra note 122 at 180 (considering section 1 in the context of justifying
an environmental hazard that contravened section 7).
128. Charter, supra note 113, § 24(1).
129. Kent Roach, Enforcement of the Charter—Subsections 24(1) and 52(1), 62 S.C.L.R.
473, 474 (2013).
130. See BOYD, supra note 122, at 180-81.
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“track record of failure may appear discouraging . . . this reflects the
evolutionary process of the law” that may require a number of
setbacks prior to success.131 So, is it possible that a section 7
challenge could be utilized to fill existing gaps in Canada’s climate
change policy?132
Sniderman and Shedletzky have explored the possibility that
members of Canada’s indigenous community could use section 7 to
successfully challenge Canada’s decision to withdraw from the KP or
its legislative inaction with respect to mandating GHG reduction.133
They assert that members of Canada’s northern indigenous
populations are likely the most suitable litigants to advance a section
7 Charter challenge, owing to the heightened impact of climate
change at high latitudes and its consequences for physical and
psychological security.134 Further, they argue that Canada’s
withdrawal from the KP likely passes the justiciability threshold in
this constitutional context135 and also that “[i]f it could be shown that
131. See BOYD, supra note 122, at 181.
132. The following analysis utilizes and builds upon the section 7 analysis found in
Andrew Stobo Sniderman & Adam Shedletzky, Aboriginal Peoples and Legal Challenges to
Canadian Climate Change Policy, 4 W. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-4 (2014).
133. Id. at 3-4.
134. Id. at 4-5 (these projected impacts resonate well with the content of both petitions
brought before the IACHR).
135. In order for a claim to proceed to a consideration of its merits, the court must be
satisfied that the issue it raises is justiciable. The case on point here is Operation Dismantle v.
The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, which involved a section 7 challenge to the federal
executive’s decision to conclude an agreement with the United States allowing cruise missile
testing in Northern Canada during a time of heightened Cold War tension. The peace groups
that initiated this litigation alleged that Canada’s decision to allow weapons testing in Canada
increased the threat of nuclear war and attacks on Canada, which, in turn, increased the threat
to Canadian lives. This executive action was a valid exercise of the Royal prerogative to
conduct foreign affairs and national defense, and the federal government requested that the
applicants’ statement of claim be struck for “disclosing no reasonable cause of action” (¶ 1).
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada authored by Dickson J. concluded that
the statement of claim ought to be struck because “the causal link between the actions of the
Canadian government, and the alleged violation of appellants’ rights under the Charter is
simply too uncertain, speculative and hypothetical to sustain a cause of action” (¶ 3). The
majority did not embark on a justiciability analysis, except to note that they “agree[d] in
substance” (¶ 38) with the reasons of Madam Justice Wilson, who concurred in result only and
authored an opinion that assessed justiciability and the proper role of the courts. Wilson J.
dismissed the argument that claims of this sort are “inherently non-justiciable” because of
evidentiary concerns or concerns about the appropriateness of the subject matter (¶ 63). In so
doing, she dismissed the application of the American Political Questions Doctrine in the
Canadian context to conclude that when the Court is “being asked to . . . decide whether any
particular act of the executive violates the rights of the citizens, then it is not only appropriate
that we answer the question; it is our obligation under the Charter to do so” (¶ 64).
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government inaction on reducing greenhouse gas emissions caused
section 7 violations, courts could intervene.”136 These authors
conclude that causation presents the greatest obstacle for meeting the
first step of the section 7 test, even in light of the contextual and
flexible standard endorsed by the SCC, given that GHGs are well
mixed in the atmosphere and Canada’s “historical contribution . . . is
a relatively small fraction of the whole.”137 Moving to part two of the
section 7 test, and assuming that the causation obstacle can be
surmounted,
Sniderman
and
Shedletzky
identify
gross
disproportionality as the “most promising argument” available to
claimants to assert Canada has not complied with fundamental
principles of justice in its approach to climate change.138 Finally, and
with respect to remedies, these authors question whether a court
would be so bold as to declare something like a withdrawal from the
KP unconstitutional or whether they would opt to identify a remedy
that helps prevent section 7 breaches moving forward, such as
recommending “additional measures to help northerly communities
adapt to climate change.”139 Adding to their discussion of remedies, it
is important to note that even in the unlikely event that a clear section
7 violation is found in the climate change context, the courts are
likely to exercise their discretion in crafting a remedy that shows
considerable deference to the executive and/or legislative branches of
government given how politically charged and complex the issue
is.140 For example, consider the remedy given by the SCC in response
to Omar Khadr’s petition to the courts for judicial review of the Prime
Minister’s decision not to formally request Khadr’s repatriation from
the United States, where he was being held at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base on war crime and terrorism charges.141 The SCC was satisfied
that Khadr’s section 7 rights had been violated as a result of Canada’s
participation in his interrogation, but instead of giving a specific
remedy, the Court stated:
[W]e conclude that the appropriate remedy is to declare that, on
the record before the Court, Canada infringed Mr. Khadr’s s. 7
rights, and to leave it to the government to decide how best to
136. Sniderman & Shedletzky, supra note 132, at 4.
137. Sniderman & Shedletzky, supra note 132, at 6.
138. Sniderman & Shedletzky, supra note 132, at 6-7.
139. Sniderman & Shedletzky, supra note 132, at 7.
140. Arguably, this amounts to an informal or partial application of something akin to
the Political Questions Doctrine.
141. Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (Can.).
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respond to this judgment in light of current information, its
responsibility for foreign affairs, and in conformity with the
Charter.142

These conclusions are directly relevant to the ability of section 7
litigation to close the gaps identified in this Article. Specifically, the
sort of legislative/executive inaction that has excluded the oil and gas
sector and also consistent executive reluctance to pursue (meaningful)
international cooperative action are analogous to the case studies
considered by Sniderman and Shedletzky. It is true that successful
section 7 litigation is unlikely at this point in time,143 which means
that any prospective litigants (including public interest environmental
organizations) that might be considering challenging Canada’s
decision to not participate in any successor agreement to the KP, or
the politically charged decision to continue to exclude the oil and gas
sector from national regulatory standards, faces a significant uphill
battle. But what if our understanding of the content of section 7
evolves or changes to reflect the centrality of a healthy environment
in our day-to-day lives and its connection to basic human rights?
Section 7 has emerged as the centerpiece of the discussion
surrounding new Canadian environmental rights. Leading Canadian
environmental law practitioner and scholar David Boyd has identified
this shortcoming as one of the areas where the Charter, and Canada’s
Constitution more generally, lags compared to the rest of the world.
He notes that “[a]s of 2012, 147 out of 193 national constitutions
incorporate environmental rights and/or responsibilities.”144 Boyd
presents the case for “greening” Canada’s Constitution by including
the right to a healthy environment in the Charter, identifying the
following mechanisms for achieving this: (i) direct political
amendment of the Charter; (ii) a judicial reference initiated by the
government (federal or provincial) to the courts requesting that they
consider whether the constitution contains an implicit right to a
healthy environment; or (iii) strategic litigation advanced to make the
case for an implicit right to a healthy environment.145 Given Canada’s
current political climate, the most likely option is the use of strategic

142. Id. at ¶ 39.
143. Sniderman & Shedletzky, supra note 132, at 15 (stating that “[a]t present, our
proposed litigation strategies are likely to fail”).
144. BOYD, supra note 122, at 88.
145. BOYD, supra note 122, at 171.
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litigation to secure a judicial interpretation that recognizes this
environmental right as being implicit in section 7.
I am not convinced that climate change offers the appropriate
substance for this sort of strategic litigation; however, in the event
that an appropriate fact scenario that can sustain such a claim presents
itself, this would present an opportunity for the courts to modernize
Charter rights. If the courts are ever going to accept the argument that
the right to a healthy environment is implicit to section 7, it will likely
occur in the context of a traditional pollution problem that does not
suffer from the same causation frailties. For example, Ecojustice is
currently representing two members of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation
who live in Sarnia, Ontario’s so-called “Chemical Valley” in a
Charter challenge against the Government of Ontario.146 Initially filed
in 2010, this application for judicial review is based on these
claimants’ ongoing health problems and the observation that their
community has been experiencing a skewed female-male birth ratio
for some time.147 Their challenge asks the court to declare that
an order issued by Ontario’s Ministry of the Environment that
allows Suncor Energy Products to increase production at part of
its Sarnia refinery violated their Charter rights. [Ecojustice’s]
clients believe that the government’s failure to take into account
the cumulative effects of pollution from all the industrial activity
around their community violates . . . basic human rights under
sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms – their rights to life, liberty and security of the person,
and the right to equality.148

In the event this case, or a similar one, succeeds in convincing a
court that Canadian citizens do have the right to a healthy
146. Lockridge v. Ministry of the Environment (Director), Notice of Application to
Ontario Divisional Court for Judicial Review, Court File No. 528/10 (Oct. 19,2010);
Defending the rights of Chemical Valley residents – Charter challenge, ECOJUSTICE (May 21,
2015), http://www.ecojustice.ca/case/defending-the-rights-of-chemical-valley-residents-charter
-challenge/ [hereinafter Ecojustice Charter Challenge].
147. See Environmental Rights: Human Rights and Pollution in Sarnia’s Chemical
Valley, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTRE: UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA 2 (2011).
148. Ecojustice Charter Challenge, supra note 146. Note that this case is ongoing. In
Lockridge v. Director, Ministry of the Environment, 2012 ONSC 2316, the court dismissed the
government’s motion to have their application dismissed. For an analysis that provides the
ways in which the court might approach this case in the context of the right to a healthy
environment, see Catherine Jean Archibald, What Kind of Life? Why the Canadian Charter’s
Guarantees of Life and Security of the Person Should Include the Right to a Healthy
Environment, 22 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2013-2014).
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environment, it is likely that in the course of coming to this
conclusion, the court would provide a novel approach to
understanding justiciability, causation, and the fundamental principles
of justice in the environmental harm context. This, in turn, might just
increase the likelihood that individuals would then be able to hold the
government accountable for a wider range of environmental harms,
including those caused by climate change.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, this analysis must conclude that the prospect of
successfully closing the significant gaps in Canada’s climate change
strategy through litigation is, at least for the time being, quite slim.
What is clear, though, is that there is considerable room to pursue
different types of litigation in the face of climate change, even despite
past failures. Moreover, each time a court is confronted with an aspect
of this complex and dynamic issue, there is a possibility that
something unexpected may happen. Alternatively, if one subscribes to
the belief that the impact of litigation transcends the ultimate success
or failure of any one case, it is possible to frame “a loss at trial . . .
[as] a political victory for climate change activists—by framing
climate change as a threat to rights and by requiring the government
to justify its ongoing failure to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas
emissions.”149 Even unsuccessful litigation has the effect of raising
awareness and attracting considerable media attention to difficult
societal issues. So, while “all litigation, all the time” is not a suitable
rallying call for those impacted by climate change and those who
oppose continued government inaction, litigation must not be
discarded since it might play an important role moving forward.
There is no panacea to the complex and multi-faceted climate
change problem. Accepting this reality can be quite difficult because
it is clear that time is of the essence. Still, we must remain focused on
the actions that can be taken individually, or as members of a larger
community. Each positive action represents a step forward towards a
more sustainable future and helps maintain the hope that our elected
officials and the international community will finally respond in kind.
This is our burden and our obligation.

149. Sniderman & Shedletzky, supra note 132, at 16.

